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Investment 
OStrategy 
at Morse 
Cutting Tool 
by the Industrial Cooperative Assodation 
(ICA) 
Local #277 of the United Electrical, Radio and 
Machine Workers of America contracted with 
the ICA for a preliminary assessment of the long 
term viability of Morse Cutting Tools. The union 
had become alarmed by declining employment at 
Morse and by Morse management's statements 
regarding the company's inadequate profitability 
and shrinking market share. Of even greater con-
cern was the threat that the conglomerate which 
owns Morse, Gulf+Western (G+W), might 
close the New Bedford plant. We were asked to 
examine Morse's position in the cutting tool bus-
iness with particular attention to the adequacy of 
G+W's investment in plant and equipment and 
of Morse's management strategy. 
Because of the lack of access to internal com-
pany information and the need for a quick assess-
ment, the scope of this study was limited. It is 
based on publicly available information and in-
terviews with observers familiar with Morse and 
the cutting tool industry. It presents preliminary 
conclusions about the company's ability to com-
pete and identifies destructive policies and prac-
tices which should be addressed by Morse or 
G+W. 
The results of the study and our recommenda-
tions regarding further research are presented in 
this report. It is organized in four sections: 
I Summary of results 
II Summary of major research activities 
III Presentation of findings 
IV Recommendations for future study 
Summary of Results 
U.E. Local 277's concerns about Morse's long 
term viability are warranted. Preliminary investi-
gation has raised serious questions about Gulf 
+Western's intent and ability to manage the 
company in a way which enhances its long term 
security. There are strong indications that signifi-
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cant improvements in both the rate of capital in-
vestment in and the management of this company 
will be required to ensure Morse's continuation 
as a leader in the cutting tool industry and as an 
employer of 800 New Bedford area residents. 
For several years, Gulf-(-Western has pursued 
a company-wide "asset redeployment" strategy 
which involves systematically removing its assets 
from capital intensive subsidiaries and investing 
in the "undervalued" stocks of other companies. 
When applied to Morse this strategy seems to 
have meant an unwillingness to make the new in-
vestments in plant and equipment necessary to 
keep Morse competitive. Faced with older, less 
productive equipment than their competitors and 
with pressure from G + W to keep profits high in 
a recession, Morse's management has raised 
prices and cut important departments and pro-
grams. These moves appear to have exacerbated 
the impact of the recession and have led to 
declines in both sales and market share. 
It is important that the focus of the debate 
over the causes of Morse's problems shift from 
labor costs (Morse's wages appear to be lower 
than the wages paid in other Massachusetts cut-
ting tool plants) to questions of G+W's past, 
present, and future management of Morse. We 
believe that continued application of Morse's 
current investment and pricing policies and cost 
cutting efforts will further undermine the firm's 
market position. 
It appears that: 
• Inadequate investment in new equipment and 
an inefficient plant have raised Morse's produc-
tion costs above its competition's, making it dif-
ficult for the company to compete. 
• Emphasis on short term profitability during 
a recession has resulted in pricing policies and 
service and personnel cuts which are undermin-
ing relationships with distributors and customers 
and reducing the company's ability to service the 
market well. 
• An alienating management style and lack of 
confidence in management's policies and prac-
tices have hurt employee morale. As a result, 
many experienced white collar personnel have 
left. Many remaining employees are unmotivat-
ed. Low morale and inexperienced workers are 
bound to hurt Morse's performance. 
These problems were identified through dis-
cussions with industry experts, past and present 
distributors of Morse products, and present and 
past employees of Morse and were highlighted by 
a comparison with a successful Massachusetts 
competitor, Litton's Union/Butterfield Division. 
Our research activities are described briefly in the 
following Sectton. A fuller discussion of our 
findings is presented in Section III. 
Summary of Major Research Activities 
A. Gulf+Western. We reviewed G+W's SEC 
Filings (lOK's),- annual reports for the past three 
years, and the conglomerate's Fact Book 1981. 
We also discussed G+W's strategy and perform-
ance with G+W investment analysts at major 
brokerage firms in New York. 
B. Cutting Tool Industry. Our information-
gathering about the industry included: (1) discus-
sions with a Wall-Street industry analyst, the Cut-
ting Tool Manufacturers' Association, and an in-
dustry follower at American Machinist; (2) re-
view of past and current copies of American 
Machinist and Machine Age magazines and re-
cent investment advisory reports on the industry 
and specific publicly traded competitors; (3) dis-
cussions with previous Morse employees, cur-
rently working for other companies in the indus-
try and with Morse distributors; and (4) statistics 
from the Commerce Department's "Annual Sur-
vey of Manufacturers." 
C. Morse, Greenfield Tap & Die (TRW) and 
United Twist Drill (Union Butterfield Division of 
Litton Industries). We collected information 
about the operations and profitability of these 
plants by means of (1) interviews with union lead-
ers at the plants; (2) U.E. staff; (3) interviews 
with Morse employees; (4) discussions with cur-
rent and past Morse distributors; (5) questioning 
experienced white and blue collar workers who 
have left Morse in the last few years; (6) review of 
Morse's publications and presentations to the 
U.E.; (7) review of articles from The Standard 
Times. We also spoke briefly with David Camer-
on, President of Morse Cutting Tool. 
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Findings. 
G + W's "asset redeployment" strategy involves 
"the shifting of assets from operations in which 
substantial capital investments would be required 
merely to bring their facilities to competitive 
standards" (1981 Annual Report) and into in-
vestments in marketable securities. More simply, 
G + W is taking its money out of subsidiaries 
which it does not find profitable enough and in-
vesting in the stocks of other corporations which 
it believes will provide a higher return on invest-
ment. 
According to one Wall Street analyst with 
whom we spoke, in the last year or so the invest-
ment community has put considerable pressure 
on G + W to follow through on its divestment 
program. In the last year and a half, G+W has 
sold its interest in the capital-intensive paper pro-
ducts operations of its Brown Co. subsidiary 
(December 1980) and parts of New Jersey Zinc 
(September 1981). Earlier this month, the sale of 
Consolidated Cigar Corporation w&s announced. 
Meanwhile, the company increased its hold-
ings of stock and other marketable securities of 
other companies. This shifting of investment 
shows up in G+W's financial reports. While the 
Gulf+Western's Empire 
Segments contributing to fiscal 1981 
revenues and operating profits 
(excluding financial services). 
Sates Profits 
Manufacturing 
Apparel & home 
furnishing 
Leisure time 
National resources 
& building products 
Automotive 
replacement parts 
Source: Standard & Poor's Corp. 
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company's net property, plant/ and equipment 
increased by only $33 million between 1978 and 
1981, their holdings of stock in other corpora-
tions (which are not wholely-owned subsidiaries) 
and other corporate securities increased by $544 
million during the same period. 
Some of this $544 million came from the sale 
of stock in other companies, but some came from 
the profits of subsidiaries like Morse. G+W 
chose to invest these profits in new companies 
and stock rather than reinvest the money in im-
proving the operations and profitability of the 
companies which earned it. This process is illus-
trated in the financial data presented in G+W's 
Fact Book 198L These figures show that while 
investing $386 million in the stock market in 
1981, G+W invested only $6 million for cost 
saving improvements in its whole manufacturing 
division (of which Morse is only a small part)—r 
even though that division made $107 million in 
operating income. In 1980, an even smaller $4 
million was invested in lowering costs in this large 
division, despite operating earnings of $112 mil-
lion. In fact, on the average, between 1977 and 
1981, G+W spent only 94C on capital expendi-
tures in the manufacturing division for every dol-
lar of depreciation of plant and equipment, while 
the average for the conglomerate was $2.34 of re-
investment for every dollar written off. 
Although G+W officials say they have no 
plans to divest Morse, it is likely that this reallo-
cation policy has and will affect Morse. G+W is 
moving away from capital intensive industries; 
the cutting tool industry is capital intensive. 
G + W is not interested in companies which will 
require capital investment to bring them to com-
petitive standards; it appears that Morse has fall-
en far enough behind in modernization of its 
equipment that it will need a significant injection 
of capital to keep up with domestic and foreign 
competitors. Although G+W is concentrating 
its divesture efforts on its larger operations at 
present, it would be natural for the company to 
eventually divest Morse. In the meantime, lack of 
attention to redevelopment of a viable long term 
strategy and failure to invest in the plant and 
equipment at Morse seem to be running down 
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Morse, as G+W shifts its attention and re-
sources to new areas. 
An analysis of the three major areas of concern 
for Morse's viability follows. 
B. Plant and Equipment. G+W's detrimental 
handling of Morse is most clearly illustrated by 
its failure to invest in new plant and equipment 
Equipment. Over the last two decades, whole 
new generations of machine tools and related 
equipment have been introduced for use in fac-
tories such as Morse. The most modern of these 
machines—which are computerized and often 
perform more than one operation—can signifi-
cantly increase the productivity of the workforce 
and reduce related costs. An article in the Ameri-
can Machinist, written by the Numerical Control 
Society lists the potential benefits of these new 
machine tools: 
1. Their high speed of production reduces the 
time necessary to produce a product, shortening 
the lead time on orders. 
2. Since one machine can do several opera-
tions, in-process inventory is reduced and inven-
tory carrying costs are lowered. 
3. Reduced set-up time means small lots of 
standard items can be made economically, reduc-
ing raw material inventory requirements. 
4. Since one machine can replace several old 
ones, less floor space, less material handling, and 
less paper work (for routing) are necessary. 
5. The accuracy of the machines can minimize 
secondary grinding and polishing operations and 
reduce scrap, reworking, and inspection costs. 
The increased productivity gained with this 
new equipment lowers per unit variable costs of 
production, giving its users a distinct cost advan-
tage over less modern companies. When price 
competition increases, as it has during the recent 
recession, lower cost competitors can undercut 
higher cost producers like Morse. Morse reports 
that some U.S. competitors are bidding prices 
which are below Morse's direct cost of manufac-
turing. 
Many of Morse's competitors have invested in 
new equipment. This seems to be particularly 
true of fast-growing companies that buy new 
equipment as they expand, of U.S. companies 
with new plants, and of newer foreign competi-
tors. (One Japanese company which is making 
inroads in U.S. markets uses an advanced mach-
inery center concept and the most advanced tech-
nology in its one-story modern plant.) 
Almost everyone we talked to who was famil-
iar with the equipment used by Morse and its 
competitors believes Morse is behind its success-
ful U.S. and foreign competitors in moderniza-
tion of its equipment. Our estimate of recent 
equipment expenditures at three large Massachu-
setts cutting tool plants (Greenfield Tap and Die 
in Greenfield, Mass., Morse's New Bedford 
plant, and Litton's Union/Butterfield division in 
Athol, Mass.) confirmed these observations. 
In order to estimate equipment expenditure 
figures, we asked union officials at Morse, GTD, 
and UTD to compile lists of the equipment 
brought into their plants in recent years—along 
with their management's cost estimates or the 
equipment model numbers.1 We then called the 
equipment manufacturers of the unestimated 
equipment and compiled rough estimates of total 
equipment expenditures in each plant over the 
last several years. The results show Morse falling 
surprisingly far behind both GTD and UTD in 
equipment expenditures. While GTD spent an es-
timated $5 million in the last three years, and 
UTD spent more than $1.5 million,2 Morse has 
spent less than $.8 million in the last five years— 
of which only approximately $.5 million remains 
at the plant today.3 (See Appendices 1 through 3 
for cost estimate calculations.) 
Morse's level of equipment expenditures in re-
cent years compares unfavorably with the com-
pany's own purchases in the 1960's and early 
1970's. According to articles in The Standard 
Times, Morse spent $.5 million in fiscal 1962 and 
promised even more purchases in the following 
year. Morse reported spending nearly $1 million 
each year in 1966, 1967, 1974, 1975 and 1976. 
After 1976, Morse's public reporting of equip-
ment expenditures seems to have ceased. It ap-
pears that Morse has spent less in the last five 
years than in most previous single years for which 
we have information. 
Our third and final comparison of Morse's 
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equipment purchases relates it to the average 
spending on plant and equipment (capital ex-
penditures) of companies in Morse's SIC code— 
SIC 3545, Machine Tool Accessories. Our calcu-
lations, using U.S. Commerce Department fig-
ures for capital expenditures for this group, show 
that average capital expenditures for a company 
of Morse's size were $1.4 million per year for the 
four years 1977-1980.4 (See Appendice 5.) This 
figure provides another rough measure of the 
relative size of Morse's outlays.5 At the rate of 
$1.4 million per year, Morse would have spent 
almost $6.8 million in a five year period. Since 
Morse spent less than $1 million on equipment, 
and no major plant expansion was undertaken, 
we can assume that Morse's total capital expen-
ditures fall well below the average. 
Compared with similar Massachusetts plants, 
Morse's own previous spending, and the national 
average for its industrial classification, Morse's 
estimated, recent equipment purchases are re-
markably small. Failure to match the competi-
tioii's modernization efforts almost inevitably 
causes a firm to become uncompetitive. More-
over, these figures cast doubt on G+W's intent 
to maintain Morse on an on-going basis. 
Plant. Morse's old multi-story plant (part of 
which is approximately 100 years old) and ineffi-
cient lay-out further undermine its ability to com-
pete with companies that have invested in new, 
one-story facilities or have reorganized their 
work flows efficiently in older factories. Accord-
ing to reports in the Standard Times, back in 
1968 Morse's president, Hayes, recognized that 
Morse's multi-story character "is against all 
modern day practices of manufacturing." In 
1969, top management at Morse was considering 
a move to the New Bedford Industrial Park. The 
move was never made. 
With the help of workers at the New Bedford 
plant, we traced the movement of seven different 
products (two drills, two mills, two reamers, and 
one tap) through Morse's two adjoining, multi-
story buildings. We found that during the manu-
facturing process, the products were moved from 
one floor to another between eight and thirteen 
times, moving among the four floors of the older 
building and two floors of the "newer" building. 
(See a sample production flow in Appendix 4.) 
This kind of inefficient lay-out increases inven-
tory carrying costs, production time, and indirect 
manufacturing costs. Morse ordinarily employs 
seven or eight full time people to move materials 
and tools from work station to work station, 
from floor to floor. 
C. Short Term Orientation. Instead of increasing 
profitability by means of more efficient plant and 
equipment, Morse seems to have adopted a strat-
egy of achieving profit goals by reducing inven-
tory, setting high prices, and cutting costs. Our 
research indicate that Morse's pricing policies 
and cost cutting efforts are both undermining 
public relations with distributors and customers 
and diminishing Morse's ability to provide good 
service and competitively priced products in the 
long run. 
Prices. Everyone we talked with felt Morse's 
prices are generally too high to be competitive 
and that, in combination with inflexible relations 
with distributors; Morse's prices are forcing 
more and more distributors to carry competing 
lines of cutting tools in addition to or instead of 
Morse's products. 
The distributors we called had all been loyal 
Morse partners for more than 30 years, but all 
had either started carrying other lines or were 
considering switching away from Morse. Some 
felt forced by Morse's high pricing of "specials" 
(custom tools) and certain standard tools to take 
much of their business to other companies. The 
deterioration of longstanding relationships with 
distributors is especially problematic in a busi-
ness which is highly price competitive. Morse is 
losing loyalty built over the last century and is 
therefore losing access to markets that will be dif-
ficult to regain. 
Morse's price problems are exacerbated by 
what was referred to as insensitivity tp distribu-
tors' needs and the market in which they deal. 
Morse has apparently be£n heavy-handed in its 
efforts to keep distributors from selling its com-
petitors' lower priced tools. One major, long-
standing distributor no longer carries Morse after 
a dispute over prices and its handling of compet-
ing lines. Th 
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ing lines. The loss of this distributor, a major 
supplier of drills to the automobile manufactur-
ers, has cost Morse an estimated $1,000,000 a 
year in sales. 
Salespeople who have left the company esti-
mate that five or six other major distributors 
have turned to competing lines or have stopped 
carrying Morse in recent years. Furthermore, 
many sales people left Morse because the com-
pany's policies and prices made it difficult for 
them to meet customer needs and caught them in 
the jrossfire between resentful customers and the 
company. 
Reduced access to markets through distribu-
tors and high prices, which make it difficult to at-
tract new distributors and customers, have un-
doubtedly been main factors in Morse's loss of 
market share in recent years. The company's fig-
ures indicate that their market share fell 14% 
(from 7.4% to 6.8%) between 1978 and 1980 
alone. 
Cost cutting. Many Morse employees feel that 
management cut indirect and overhead costs in 
ways which reduce Morse's ability to provide 
good service to its customers, develop new prod-
ucts, and produce efficiently. Examples of prob-
lems caused by cost cutting throughout the or-
ganization were cited by current and previous 
employees. 
• The Sales Service Engineering Department 
was responsible for troubleshooting and provid-
ing application advice and technical service to 
customers. Its staff has been reduced over the last 
five years from six people to one person (who re-
portedly has had little or no engineering exper-
ienc. Even when staffed by two or three people, 
the department was unable to undertake any sig-
nificant new product development and was un-
able to meet many customers needs on a timely 
basis. 
Sales Service rep«esentatives can play a critical 
sales support role, keeping customers happy and 
accounts growing. This kind of support becomes 
particularly important when there is high sales 
staff turnover and many sales people are unfam-
iliar with the company's products. 
• According to the October, 1981, issue of 
American Machinist, "To view the maintenance 
department as an unavoidable expense that 
should be cut to the bone...is shortsighted," 
since costs of downtime for sophisticated mach-
ines can run as high as $400 to $600 per hour. The 
article recommends a serious preventive main-
tenance program. 
Morse has no formal preventive maintenance 
program fri place. According to one maintenance , 
worker, manufacturers' suggestions for new 
equipment maintenance are not followed and 
with the exception of some preventive work by 
millwrights, little or no repair work is done until 
the machines stop functioning satisfactorily. 
• Morse's Method Engineering and Standards 
departments were merged a year ago. The com-
bined department is reportedly dwindling and un-
able to keep up with its workload. As a result, 
specials are not always properly screened, and the 
company incurs unnecessary losses due to failure 
to properly assess the special costly features of 
the custom tools. One engineer suggested that 
Morse is not competitive on specials because they 
do not give Methods engineers the time or re-
sources necessary to analyze the most efficient 
way to produce them or buy the special tooling 
that may be necessary. Instead the specials go 
through standard operations, causing costly 
spoilage. 
• Many believe that there is inadequate train-
ing of new personnel throughout the plant. Train-
ing for product engineers has dropped over the 
years from 40 to 4 weeks. Maintenance people 
are expected to learn about new generations of 
equipment on their own initiative and are com-
pensated for tuition costs only in proportion to 
their grades in the classes. Inside sales people re-
ceive little technical training. Inadequate training 
is especially problematic when a firm experiences 
high turnover, like that experienced recently at 
Morse. 
Morale and turnover. High employee turnover 
among non-union workers in recent years has re-
sulted in the loss of many experienced white col-
lar workers. Most recent departees we contacted 
had been with the company for 14 years or more. 
Four out of six regional sales managers have left 
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the company in the last five years. The total loss 
of sales people in the past several years has been 
estimated at 60% or more of the sales force. Sim-
ilarly, all experienced sales service engineers have 
left the company or been laid off. Turnover in 
most non-union departments is reported to be 
high. High turnover inevitably results in a work-
force unfamiliar with its product, its industry, 
and its customers and in many individuals who 
are new to their specific jobs. 
Morale seems to be low among remaining em-
ployees. There seems to be a widespread belief 
that (a) the company is not being run well, (b) 
that the employees themselves are not treated like 
valued and respected parts of the company, and 
(c) there are inexperienced people in supervisory 
and lower level management positions. 
While it was not possible to verify workers' al-
legations of mismanagement and inexperienced 
supervision, it is clear that management policies 
and attitudes are creating resentment and lack of 
faith in the workforce—driving some more mo-
bile employees to find jobs elsewhere and creat-
ing a morale problem for those who remain. Low 
morale cannot help but hurt the quality of the 
service provided and the productivity of the com-
pany. 
D. Intercompany Comparison. In order to test 
our conclusions about Morse's strategies, we col-
lected information about competing plants. In 
this process, we focused on one plant which has 
more successfully faced the same market as 
Morse. The Union Butterfield Division of Litton 
Industries (UTD) in Athol, Mass., is part of a 
large conglomerate, competes directly with 
Morse, has a similar product line (endmills, coun-
tersinks, carbide tip tools cutters, drills, etc.), is 
about the same size, is located in an older plant in 
Massachusetts, is organized by the U.E., and 
pays its unionized employees more than Morse. 
(See the comparison of wages and benefits paid 
to workers at Morse, Greenfield Tap and Die, 
and UTD provided by the U.E. staff in Appendix 
6.) 
We talked with Jack Davidson, president of 
U.E. Local 276 and Secretary of the Conference 
of Cutting Tool Unions, who provided us with 
the information which follows. Mr. Davidson 
portrays UTD as a company with a successful, 
forward-thinking cutting tool strategy. It stands 
in contrast with Morse. 
Plant and Equipment. Over the past decade 
UTD has updated its equipment, facility, and 
parking lots. In the last four years, they have pur-
chased new equipment costing more than $1.5 
million, while Morse invested only $.5 million. 
This investment has increased productivity with-
out causing a reduction in the workforce. Em-
ployment of production workers increased slow-
ly and steadily from 1974 until the current reces-
sion recently forced the lay-off of 50 workers, 
bringing union employment there down from 650 
to 600. 
Long Range Orientation. We did not research 
UTD's prices, and therefore cannot provide that 
comparative information. However, UTD's 
management's emphasis on long range profita-
bility is evident from its management of its re-
sources and current strategy. 
• Since the mid-seventies, UTD has improved 
its method mgineering and sales departments and 
now aggressively pursue sales which will bring in 
work suited to the skilled workforce at UTD. 
• Their Sales Service Department has two pro-
duct managers who stay in close contact with cus-
tomers. 
• The company seeks out orders for the less 
profitable specials in order to attract customers 
to their full line of products. 
• UTD gives each operator 30 minutes to an 
hour each week to oil, grease, and clean his or her 
machine, replace belts and other disposable ele-
ments, and to identify repairs for which profes-
sional help will be needed. 
• UTD's strategy in the current recession has 
been to retain as much of the workforce as possi-
ble so as to maintain the quality of their service 
and be in a position to prosper as the economy re-
covers. A UTD vice president has reported to the 
union that Litton understands that this long 
range strategy will mean lower profits in the short 
run and still supports pursuit of long term profit-
ability. 
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in their management's ability and sincere interest 
in making UTD prosper. They say their local 
management works hard to get the resources they 
need from Litton. The company claims that it is 
now number one in the cutting tool industry. 
• Turnover among white collar workers is low, 
as is salesforce turnover. 
According to Davidson, when UTD was in fi-
nancial difficulty in the early 1970's, it pursued a 
strategy similar to Morse's current direction, cut-
ting costs and demanding union givebacks. Now 
thry admit to the union that it was capital invest-
ment and long range commitment to the com-
pany which brought about the turnaround. Man-
agers have reported to the union that UTD has 
done exceptionally well for the past five years 
and that they are optimistic about the future. 
Recommendations. 
It is now time for Morse and G+W to present 
their plans for securing the company's future 
profitability through capital investment and a 
management strategy which rebuilds Morse's 
market share and ability to meet customer needs. . 
An additional, more detailed study of Gulf+ 
Western's investment in and management of 
Morse Cutting Tools is not recommended at pres-
ent. G+W's disinvestment and detrimental em-
phasis on short term profitability have emerged 
clearly from the data available to this study. 
While further exploration might lead to a refine-
ment of the estimates presented in this report, it is 
unlikely that the conclusions of a more thorough 
study would be different. 
If Morse presents a genuine turnaround plan 
and opens its books, a different kind of study— 
one which evaluates the plan's adequacy—should 
be considered. • 
Appendix 1 
New Equipment Purchased 
at Greenfield Tap and Die 
in the Last Three Years 
Equipment1 
8 Hertlein Squaring-off 
machines 
3 Hertlein Cut-off 
machines up to 3 /8" 
2 Castro Cut-off 
machines 
Junkers 
1 Flute grinder 
1 Thread grinder 
16 Lindener Thread 
grinders 
J&L Comparator 
tap? 
Estimated 
Cost 
Per Unit2 
$ 70,0003 
> 65,0003 
65,000 
75,000 
86,000 
250,000 
18,0003 
Total 
Estimated 
Cost 
$ 560,000 
195,000 
130,000 
75,000 
86,000 
4,000,000 
18,000 
TOTAL $5,064,000 
We were unable to price: 1 Hudson Vibrator, 
3 Heat Treating Machines 
The Company has rebuilt: 6 Flute grinders, 
6 Thread grinders 
1. Compiled by the Chief Steward at GTD 
2. Unless otherwise indicated, these are manage-
ment's estimates 
3. Manufacturer's estimate 
1. We received management estimates for most GTD equip-
ment and model nufhbers for Morse and UTD. 
2. UTD's estimate includes more unpriced items than the 
others. 
3. $250,000 of the equipment was removed earlier this year. 
4. The last years for which this information is available. 
5. This SIC includes cutting tool companies and manufactur-
ers of other "accessories" which face similar market con-
ditions. 
